DDASaccident726 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
11-20-2010
DDASaccident726
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident726" (2010). Global CWD Repository. 925.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/925
DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/07/2011 Accident number: 726 
Accident time: 08:10 Accident Date: 20/11/2010 
Where it occurred: CDS, Deh Sabz 
District, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: Restricted 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: various, HE charge Ground condition: demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
Because this accident involved the death of an expatriate it was covered widely in the press. 
A formal UNMACCA report of the accident was made available (by roundabout means) in 
early 2011. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being 
lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information 
becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [the Victim] a member of 
[Demining group]  
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. [Name removed], MACCA Chief of Staff convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to 
investigate the circumstances involved in the demining accident causing the death of [the 
Victim] Technical Advisor of [Demining group]. 
The BOI comprised the following personnel: 
Dr. [Name removed] Chief of QM MACCA Chairman 
[Name removed] Member 
[Name removed] Member 
[Name removed] Observer 
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out the formal investigation including the BOI 
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report. [Not made available.] 
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER 
The accident occurred in [Demining group]  CDS [Central Demolition Site] in Deh Sabz district 
of Kabul province which locates in North-East side of Kabul city, it is relatively cold in winter 
season. The CDS is surrounded by a series of hills and mountains from West, South and 
Northern sides. Kabul Bagram road is passed through the East side around 800 meters away 
from CDS. There are 2 antenna installments of AWCC and MTN around 1000 meters to the 
north side of the CDS.    
Priority of Task 
The task was of high priority, because the village by village EOD teams of [Demining group] 
collected munitions/ERW from the villages and were ready for demolition. Therefore, the 
demolition was planned in said CDS.  
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
Although the CDS was well prepared, the distance between firing point and demolition pits 
and the locations of sentries were also maintained properly. But the firing point was small and 
lack of enough space for required personnel to easily locate there during the demolition 
operations. The firing point was also lack of sight window to the demolition pits. Presence of 2 
antennas of AWCC and MTN telecommunication system in 1km vicinity to the CDS and also 
presence of Kabul Bagram road in 800 meters distance where military convoys have been 
passing frequently can create Electro Magnetic Radiation and affect Electrical initiation 
demolition.     
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
The deceased Technical Advisor [the Victim] himself was in charge of the task. Good 
management, supervision and discipline was in place in the task site.  
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 
The EOD teams of [Demining group]have been visited regularly by MACCA external QA, but 
the CDS has not been visited in 2010. WRA is also conducting external QA visits on 
[Demining parent group] EOD teams and the CDS as well.  
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING 
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The communication between CDS and [Demining group] office was maintained on daily basis. 
And all [Demining group] operations staff in the fields are submitting their reports to their 
office regularly. The accident report was also communicated immediately from the CDS to the 
office.   
MEDICAL REPORTS 
The victim TA expired immediately after accident occurred. But medical support was available 
in the site.     
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS 
The BOI team met with was able to conduct interview with [Name removed] the 
representative of [Demining group] to the BOI team. The statement is attached to this report 
as Annex C.   
DETAILS OF THE MINE/ERW INVOLVED 
ERW (smoke grenades) items were collected by EOD village by village teams and then were 
arranged for demolition in CDS in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs.  
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
As the accident happened in CDS, no mine or re-mining were involved in this accident. 
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT 
Nil 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The deceased TA worn his protective jacket and a Helmet, but as it was a heavy demolition, 
so the PPE could not protect him.   
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD) 
Not required. 
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU) 
Not required. 
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT 
Deceased Technical Advisor was trained by the British Royal Air Force,  and had over nine 
years experience in EOD; worked all over the world and had been in  Afghanistan nearly two 
years. No refresher training was required to him. 
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT 
[The Victim] was killed in the spot. 
PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE 
To be filled by [Demining group] 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT 
The demolition team of [Demining group] arranged the smoke grenades in demolition pit in 
their CDS on 07:00 and then started Ordnance Disposal Operation, disposing of smoke 
grenades using electric demolition procedures. On 07:33 they conducted first fire by the 
exploder machine from their firing point. They waited for almost 18 minutes and then 
Technical Advisor started conducting Electric Misfire Procedures, he made manual approach 
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to correct misfire. On 08:10 the accident occurred and TA was killed immediately after 
accident. 
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT 
Accident occurred due to Electro Magnetic Radiation and Time on Target; Technical Advisor 
had cell phone in close proximity and most likely using a satellite phone in very close 
proximity to electric demolition set up; Technical Advisor spent nearly 19 minutes correcting 
misfire. 
SUMMARY 
It is the view of the BOI team that the accident occurred due to Electro Magnetic Radiation 
(EMR) and Time on Target; Technical Advisor had Cell Phone in close proximity and most 
likely using a Satellite Phone in very close proximity to electric demolition set up.    
CONCLUSION 
It is the BOI conclusion that the Technical Advisor, [the Victim] made the mistake in terms of 
having electric devices while working on a misfire case in a very close proximity to the 
demolition pit.    
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE 
The BOI recommend the following points to be considered by [Demining group] in their future 
demolition operations:  
• The location of CDS requires to be reviewed by [Demining group] in order to make 
sure that the Electrical demolitions are not disturbed by any EMR.  
• Extreme care should be taken by CDS supervisors and those who conduct misfire 
checks to avoid keeping and using electronic devices such as mobile phones and 
hand held radios during this drill. 
• The firing point should be prepared in a way to position required personnel during the 
demolition and have a well protected sight window to the demolition pit.  
Signed Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman 
 
ANNEXES: [ Not made available] 
Annex A BOI - Terms of Reference 
Annex B Site Map 
Annex C Witness Interviews and Statements 
Annex D  Internal investigation report 
A Lessons Learned document reads: “LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining 
group] FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT. This lessons learned was filed due to some legal 
issues in DI’s legal department.” 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 916 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 34 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Protection used: Frag jacket; Helmet 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. The Victim "expired immediately after 
accident occurred". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim Inattention because the investigators 
concluded that the Victim made an error by using an electronic device that caused a 
detonation while he was close by. However, from the limited details made available in the 
report, the proximity of other possible sources of electronic interference mean that the 
detonation could have had another cause. The selection of a demolition site in a place where 
there was a poor overview and where electronic disturbance might cause problems was a 
management responsibility, so the secondary cause is listed as a Management Control 
Inadequacy. 
The Victim waiting 18 minutes after the misfire before “starting electronic misfire procedures”. 
After a further 19 minutes the detonation occurred. This is a longer “soak time” than most 
consider necessary after an electrical misfire. The number of smoke grenades involved was 
not recorded and it is presumed that the number was irrelevant and that it was the demolition 
charge itself that caused the fatal injuries. The Victim may have been handling the charge at 
the time. 
This report was made available by an unusual route and the report was stamped “This BoI 
should not be released”. The suppression of the report is another example of the UN 
supported MACCA failing to make accident reports available and so ignoring the 
requirements of the IMAS. Afghan national staff have often been more responsible than the 
internationals with overall responsibility. In this case, the BoI report lacks detail and does not 
offer any compelling explanation of the events surrounding the accident. The statement that 
the Victim was “most likely using a satellite phone in very close proximity to electric demolition 
set up” requires some evidence to back it up. If the Satellite phone was in use, the timed 
billing regime could have confirmed that, making it more than “most likely”. If there is no 
evidence that he was using the phone, it was not “most likely”, merely a possibility.  
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